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THE INVESTMENT BANKER AND THE
CREDIT REGULATIONS
ROBERTA S. KAR1MEL*
Pursuant to authority granted by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Federal Reserve Board promulgated the margin regula-
tions to prevent the excessive use of credit for the purchase or
carrying of securities. Recent developments indicate that these
regulations may be applied to various types of financings arranged
by the investment banker for corporate and institutional clients.
The author examines the possible applicability of the margin reg-
ulations to the investment banker, concluding that these require-
ments impose severe restrictions on investment banking which are
anomalous from both a business and a policy standpoint.
I
INTRODUCTION
R ECENT developments have made the investment banker and
his attorneys acutely conscious of the possible applicability
of the credit regulations, particularly Regulation T, to various
types of financings arranged by the investment banker for cor-
porate and institutional clients. During the past year, more than
previously, the credit regulations1 have been rigorously enforced
by the government in both civil and criminal prosecutions.2 Also
in a lawsuit between private litigants, the Second Circuit held that
a loan made in violation of the margin regulations was void and
therefore unenforceable 3 Most recently, in July 1969, the credit
regulations were each amended so as to be made more nearly
equal in their application to loans to purchase over-the-counter
stocks, 4 but significant differences persist among them.
* Member, New York Bar. A.B., 1959, Radcliffe College; LL.B., 1962, New
York University.
I FRB Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1969); FRB Reg. U, 12 C.F.R. § 221
(1969); FRE Reg. G, 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1969); all promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board, under Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78g (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1964).
2 United States v. Whorl, Docket No. 69 Crim. 486 (S.D.N.Y., June 5, 1969)
(indictment returned), was the first criminal charge brought under Regulation U
since its enactment in 1934. See United States v. Weisscredit Banca Commerciale e
d'Investimenti, Docket No. 70 Crim. 29 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 14, 1970) (indictment re-
turned); United States v. Lerner, Docket No. 69 Crim. 577 (S.DN.Y., June
23, 1969) (indictment returned), and United States v. Coggeshall & Hicks,
Docket No. 69 Crim. 431 (S.D.N.Y., May 16, 1969) (indictment returned), were
criminal prosecutions during the past year based on violations of Regulation T;
SEC v. Madison Square Garden Corp., Docket No. 69 Civ. 4364 (SD.N.Y. 1969),
an action for an injunction, included allegations of Regulation T violations.
3 Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3173 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1969).
4 Prior to July 29, 1968, broker-dealers subject to the margin requirements
were permitted to extend credit only on securities registered on a national securities
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This article will explore a number of situations in which
Regulation T would appear to invalidate financial arrangements
effected by an investment banker, although a commercial banker
or other lender could legally make such loans. Further, to the
extent that such situations involve the financing of essentially
private, rather than public ventures, the prohibitions placed upon
the investment banker under present interpretations of Regulation
T by the agencies responsible for its enforcement, would not ap-
pear to be within the statutory purposes of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. This article also will discuss the differences between
loans which lawfully may be obtained by an investment banking
firm and by the individuals associated with such a firm, the re-
strictions on the borrowings by individuals being more severe.
In the opinion of this writer, the credit regulations were
not designed to cover the activities of an investment banker, par-
ticularly in the area of financing new or private corporate ven-
tures, and the extent to which Regulation T may restrict such
activities is anomalous from both a business and a legal point
of view.
II
THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE MARGIN REGULATIONS
A. Statutory Authority and Purpose
The statutory authority for the margin regulations is con-
tained in Section 7 of the Exchange Act. Sections 7(a) and (b)
authorize the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations
with respect to the amount of credit that may be initially extended
and subsequently maintained on securities. Pursuant to this au-
thority, the Federal Reserve Board has promulgated Regulations
T, U and G. Section 7(c) prohibits any member of a national
securities exchange or any broker or dealer from directly or
indirectly extending or maintaining credit or arranging for the
extension or maintenance of credit to or for any customer on
securities or on collateral other than securities, except in accor-
dance with the rules and regulations of the Federal Reserve Board.
Section 7(d) makes it unlawful for other lenders to extend or
maintain credit or arrange for the extension or maintenance of
exchange. However, on July 29, 1968, the Exchange Act was amended to permit
regulation of the amount of credit that may be extended and maintained with
respect to securities not registered on a national securities exchange. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78g (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1964). The Federal Re-
serve Board revised the margin regulations to conform to the amendments to the
statute on July 8, 1969. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular No.
6347 (June 6, 1969); Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular No. 6291
(Feb. 11, 1969); Fed. Reg. Doc. Nos. 69-1983-85 (filed Feb. 14, 1969).
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credit in contravention of the rules and regulations of the Federal
Reserve Board.
The margin requirements were enacted for the purpose of
preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying
of securities. Their major objective is to regulate and restrict the
volume of credit devoted to financing transactions in securities,
in order to protect the national economy.5 Three separate philos-
ophies have been found in the legislative history of the Exchange
Act as a justification for the margin requirements: 6 (1) excessive
credit should not be permitted to cause undue market fluctu-
ations; 7 (2) credit should not be diverted from more desirable
uses elsewhere in the economy into the stock market;8 and (3)
investors should be protected from buying on too thin a margin.9
In cases arising under the margin regulations, one or the
other of these philosophies has been emphasized in order to justify
a particular result.' ° However, the Exchange Act was based on
the premise that stock market speculation was inherently evil
and largely responsible for the Great Depression. Both the Senate
and House Reports quote a message sent by President Roosevelt
to Congress on February 9, 1934, which contains the following
statement:
[0] utside the field of legitimate investment, naked speculation has
been made far too alluring and far too easy for those who could
and for those who could not afford to gamble.
Such speculation has run the scale from the individual who
has risked his pay envelope or his meager savings on a margin
transaction involving stocks with whose true value he was wholly
unfamiliar, to the pool of individuals or corporations with large
resources, often not their own, which sought by manipulation to
raise or depress market quotations far out of line with reason,
all of this resulting in loss to the average investor, who is of
necessity personally uninformed."1
The Reports also contain a supplemental letter of March 26,
Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443, 445 (1963).
SII L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1242-43 (2d ed. 1961); Comment, 116 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 103, 114-15 (1967).
7 S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
S Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
9 S. Rep. No. 792, supra note 7, at 3; S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1934).
10 Compare Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949),
with Moscarelli v. Staum, 288 F. Supp. 453, 458-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
Serzysko v. The Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S-D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,
409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3173 (Nov. 10, 1969).
11 S. Rep. No. 792, supra note 7, at 1-2; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, supra note 8,
at 1-2.
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1934, from President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, which states:
The people of this country are, in overwhelming majority, fully
aware of the fact that unregulated speculation in securities and in
commodities was one of the most important contributing factors
in the artificial and unwarranted "boom" which had so much to do
with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929.12
To some extent the bill was a compromise between those who felt
it was wise social policy to prohibit the average investor from
purchasing securities on credit and those who felt that some
borrowed money was necessary for a highly liquid market.13
The staff members of the Federal Reserve Board who testi-
fied at the Congressional Hearings on the Exchange Act were
primarily concerned with curbing stock market speculation, as
opposed to directing money into other channels or protecting
investors. 4 Mr. E. A. Goldenweiser, Director of Research and
Statistics of the Federal Reserve Board, in his testimony on the
Exchange Act stated:
It is often said that the stock exchange diverts funds from
business to the stock market. As a general statement, that state-
ment is not, strictly speaking, correct, because the credit does not
stay in the stock market.
It is, however, true that the stock exchange diverts credit
from small industries throughout the country into the large cor-
porations.15
Mr. Goldenweiser and Mr. Woodlief Thomas, who were on the
Research Staff of the Federal Reserve Board, were in agreement
that excessive stock market credit made securities rise too high
and fast and fall too low and fast, and stimulated a rapid expansion
and contraction of the total amount of credit in the economy.16
As the foregoing reflects, regardless of the differing points
of view of persons responsible for framing the provisions of the
Exchange Act, an important objective of the statute was to curtail
credit extended to investors or traders to purchase securities
listed on the national securities exchanges. To the extent that the
12 S. Rep. No. 792, supra note 7, at 1-2; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, supra note 8,
at 1-2. See also, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, 827, 829
(1934).
13 Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, supra note 12, at 97.
14 The House Report on the Exchange Act explicitly states that the main
purpose of the bill is neither to increase the safety of security loans to lenders
nor to protect the small speculator, even though "such a result will be achieved
as a by-product of the main purpose." H.R. Rep. No. 1383, supra note 8, at 8,
15 Hearings on H.R. 78S2, supra note 12, at 67-68.
16 Id. at 57, 67.
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margin regulations encompassed credit to purchase over-the-
counter securities, the aim was to prevent evasions of the statute.
Mr. Woodlief Thomas analyzed the types of stock market credit
which should be regulated by statute as follows: (1) credit ob-
tained by traders from banks (2) credit obtained by traders from
brokers and (3) credit obtained by brokers from banks.1'
B. Differences Between the Margin Regulations
Regulation T is applicable to any "creditor" as defined in
the Regulation, namely, "any broker or dealer, including every
member of a national securities exchange."' s Regulation U applies
to banks which includes, in addition to member banks of the
Federal Reserve system, any banking institution organized under
the laws of the United States or any other banking institution,
whether incorporated or not, doing business under the laws of
any state of the United States, a substantial portion of the busi-
ness of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary
powers similar to those permitted to national banks.19 Regulation
G applies to any person who is not subject to Regulation T or
Regulation U and who, in the ordinary course of business during
any calendar quarter, extends or arranges for the extension of
$50,000 or more, or has outstanding at any time during the quar-
ter $100,000 or more in credit, secured directly or indirectly, in
whole or in part, by collateral that includes any "margin" se-
curities.2
0
In general, a broker or dealer subject to Regulation T is
prohibited from extending credit to its customers for the purpose
of purchasing or carrying securities, except on margin securities,
and then the amount of the loan may not exceed a percentage
of the market value of the securities, now twenty per cent, which
is set by the Federal Reserve Board from time to time. 21 Similarly,
a Regulation U lender may not loan more than twenty per cent
of the current market value of any stocks which are directly or
indirectly securing a credit to purchase or carry any margin
stocks,- and a Regulation G lender may not loan more than
twenty per cent of the current market value on any margin secu-
17 Id. at 51.
Is 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(b) (1969).
10 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(6) (1964).
20 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(a), (c) (1969).
21 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.3(b), 220.8 (1969). The operation of the credit regula-
tions is explained generally in Kelly & Webb, Credit and Securities: The Margin
Requirements, 24 Bus. L. 1153 (1969).
22 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.1(a), 221.4(a) (1969).
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rities which are collateral for a loan to purchase or carry any such
securities2
Despite the apparent similarity between the three regulations,
there are significant differences in their coverage of loans to
purchase or carry securities other than "margin" securities, as
defined in the regulations. Under Regulations U and G a "margin
stock" or "margin security" is a stock or security registered on
a national securities exchange, an "O-T-C margin stock," a debt
security convertible into a margin stock or security, a warrant
or right to purchase a margin stock or security, and, with certain
exceptions, securities of an investment company registered pur-
suant to Section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.2
Under Regulation T a "margin security" is any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any O-T-C margin stocky"
Under all three regulations, an O-T-C margin stock is a stock
not traded on a national securities exchange which the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System has determined to have
the degree of national investor interest, the depth and breadth
of market, the availability of information respecting the stock
and its issuer and the character and permanence of the issuer
to warrant subjecting such security to the provisions pertaining
to Q-T-C margin stocks. From time to time the Federal Reserve
Board publishes a list of Q-T-C margin stocks. 8
The coverage of Regulation T is much broader than the
coverage of Regulations U and G with respect to (1) loans to
purchase or carry securities which do not fall within the definitions
of margin stocks or securities, including the securities of closely
held non-public corporations, and (2) loans to purchase or carry
any securities where such loans are not collateralized by stocks
or margin securities. Either of these two types of loans may
be made without regard to the collateral restrictions of Regulations
U or G. However, a Regulation T lender is prohibited from making
a loan to purchase securities other than margin securities, whether
such loan is secured or unsecured, and further, may not accept
any collateral for a loan to purchase securities except margin
securities. Such securities must be assigned whatever loan value is
prescribed at the time by the Federal Reserve Board.
C. The Operation of Regulation T
Regulation T limits all financial relations between any "cred-
itor" and any "customer." A customer is defined to include "any
2 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.1(c), 207.5(a) (1969).
24 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.2(d), 221.3(v) (1969).
25 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(f) (1969).
26 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.2(e), 221.3(d), 207.3(b) (1969).
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person, or any group of persons acting jointly, (1) to or for whom
a creditor is extending or maintaining credit, or (2) who, in
accordance with the ordinary usage of the trade, would be consid-
ered a customer of the creditor." This definition extends to
principals and employees of a firm and any joint venture in which
a creditor participates, if such persons would be considered cus-
tomers, but for such relationship or participation.27 All financial
relations between a creditor and a customer are deemed part of
the customer's "general" account with the creditor, except for
certain types of "special" accounts which are governed by special
rules. 28 A "general" account is what is commonly called a "margin"
account, in which margin securities are purchased and sold ac-
cording to whatever margin is permitted by the Federal Reserve
Board at the time of the transaction.
The types of "special accounts" provided for in the regulation
may be generally described as follows: (1) omnibus accounts,
in which one broker-dealer may effect transactions for another
broker-dealer on less than the normal margin on certain con-
ditions; (2) cash accounts, in which securities which have no
loan value (principally over-the-counter securities which do not
qualify as O-T-C margin stocks) must be purchased because
no credit can be extended in connection with such purchases;
(3) arbitrage accounts; (4) commodity accounts; (5) miscella-
neous accounts, in which various types of special brokerage
transactions, as well as credit transactions for a purpose other
than purchasing or carrying securities may be financed; (6)
specialist's accounts; (7) subscription accounts, in which the
acquisition of a margin security through rights may be financed;
(8) bond accounts, in which transactions in exempted or registered
non-equity securities may be financed; (9) convertible debt
security accounts, in which margin debt securities convertible
into margin stock may be carried; and (10) equity funding
accounts.20 Virtually all of these special account provisions are
either for the purpose of segregating to ascribe a loan value
different from that of a margin security to a particular type of
non-margin security, or of permitting credit extensions to broker-
dealers by other broker-dealers for the purpose of carrying out
their brokerage functions. It is noteworthy that although Reg-
ulation T purports to cover all financial relations between a
customer and a creditor, those portions of the business of a bro-
kerage firm devoted to investment banking are generally ignored.
27 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(c) (1969). Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443 (1963).
28 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(a) (1969).
- 12 C.F.R. § 220.4 (1969).
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The only types of transactions which relate to investment banking,
as opposed to commission or trading activities, specifically dealt
with are non-purpose loans and financial arrangements between
members of an underwriting syndicate, which are exempted.
Most security credit is extended by member firms of the
New York Stock Exchange, 30 which has its own margin rules
over and above the requirements of Regulation T.31 Many mem-
ber firms have developed fairly complex procedures to insure
compliance with the margin requirements, but such procedures
and requirements are concerned primarily with the permissible
debit balances in the accounts of a firm's brokerage customers."
D. Prohibitions Against Arranging for Credit
Section 7(c) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for
a broker-dealer to "arrange" for the extension or maintenance
of credit in contravention of the credit regulations. Regulation
T provides:
A creditor may arrange for the extension or maintenance of
credit to or for any customer of such creditor by any person upon
the same terms and conditions as those upon which the creditor,
under the provisions of this part, may himself extend or maintain
such credit to such customer, but only upon such terms and condi-
tions, except that this limitation shall not apply with respect to
the arranging by a creditor for a bank subject to Part 221 of this
chapter (Regulation U) to extend or maintain credit on registered
securities or exempted securities.83
In Sutro Brothers & Co., 4 the SEC Division of Trading and
Exchanges urged that a broker unlawfully "arranges" for a credit
extension if knowing or with reasonable grounds to know that
a customer has secured credit in excess of that permitted by
Regulation T, the broker performs any act for the purpose of
assisting the customer in implementing the loan. Similarly, in
Russell L. Irish,35 the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.(NASD) took the position that mere knowledge on the part
30 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, pt. 4, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963) [hereinafter Special Study].
31 Rule 421, NYSE Constitution and Rules 421, 3272 (1966); Rule 431,
id. at ff 2431, 3751-57; Rule 432, id. at ff 2432, 3757-60. The National Association
of Securities Dealers has adopted Regulation T as part of its Rules of Fair Prac-
tice. NASD Manual ffl 4001-25, 5267.
32 See Dept. of Member Firms of the New York Stock Exchange, Super-
vision and Management of Registered Representatives and Customer Accounts 3,
8, 13, 17, 22 (1967).
33 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(a) (1969) (emphasis added).
34 41 S.E.C. 443 (1963).
35 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7718, at 3 (Oct. 5, 1965), aff'd,
Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
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of a broker that a loan had been made to a customer by a bank
secured by mutual fund shares bought from the broker, made the
broker's participation in the transaction an unlawful arranging
where all the broker did was advise the mutual fund to send the
certificates to him for transmittal to the customer.
In both cases, the Commission rejected these contentions,
stating that:
In view of the language and history of Regulation T, we are
not prepared to find an "arranging" by a broker-dealer where the
customer on his own initiative and without recommendation, assis-
tance or advice from the broker establishes credit and the terms
thereof with another for accomplishing collateral loan transactions
and the only function, activity or connection of the broker and its
employees with the parties and the transactions is to execute the
customer's orders and follow the customer's instructions as to de-
livery of securities and receipt of payment. In our view, Regulation
T does not suggest such a result, and to hold otherwise would in
effect make the broker an insurer that customers were employing
credit, wherever secured, only to the extent that credit could be
provided by the broker.36
However, if a broker permits himself to become an inter-
mediary between his customer and another lender, by conveying
the customer's communications or instructions to the lender or
by responding to requests or directives of the lender concerning
the customer's transactions, the broker becomes so involved in the
extension or maintenance of credit that he is "arranging." There-
fore, in the Irish case, the signing of a receipt for payment of
mutual fund shares which stated that the broker would deliver the
certificates to the bank as collateral for the loan, where the bank
would not otherwise have made such payment, was held by the
Ninth Circuit to constitute an unlawful "arranging. '1 37
It is important to note that a broker can be liable for unlaw-
ful arranging with respect to a credit extension which a broker
could not make under Regulation T, even if the lender is not
acting in violation of the law. For example, the Sutro case in-
volved loans by factors, who at that time were unregulated lenders.
The respondent was in no way assisting its customers or the factors
involved to perform any unlawful act, but rather was unlawfully
arranging for loans which it could not have legally made. On
the other hand, where a broker arranges for a credit extension
by another lender, governed by Regulations U or G, and such
26 Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443, quoted in SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7718, at 3 (Oct. 5, 1965).
37 Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911
(1967).
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other lender acts illegally, the broker can be held liable either
on the theory that he is unlawfully arranging, or on the theory
that he is aiding or abetting another's violation. 8
III
NON-PURPOSE LOANS
A. Distinction Between Purpose and Non-Purpose Credits
In a special miscellaneous account, a broker-dealer may
"[e]xtend and maintain credit to or for any customer without
collateral or on any collateral whatever for any purpose other
than purchasing or carrying or trading in securities. ' ':3 9 Such a
credit is a "non-purpose" as opposed to a "purpose" credit.
However, every extension of credit made by a broker-dealer on
a margin security is presumed "to be for the purpose of purchasing
or carrying or trading in securities, unless the creditor has accepted
in good fTith a written statement" to the contrary, which spe-
cifically states that such credit is not for the purpose of purchas-
ing or carrying or trading in securities.4"
The restrictions of Regulations U and G are applicable
only to "purpose" credits, that is credits directly or indirectly
secured by certain types of collateral for the purpose of purchasing
or carrying margin stocks or securities. The term "indirectly
secured" includes any arrangement under which the customer's
right to sell, pledge or otherwise dispose of the collateral is in
any way restricted so long as the credit remains outstanding, or
any arrangement which would accelerate the maturity of the
credit.41 In general, all purpose credits to the same person are
considered a single credit, and the collateral therefore is similarly
considered. 2 The purpose of a credit is determined by substance
rather than form. "Credit which is for the purpose, whether im-
mediate, incidental, or ultimate, of purchasing or carrying a margin
stock is 'purpose credit,' despite any temporary application of
funds otherwise."" Further, a credit to reduce or retire an in-
debtedness incurred to purchase a stock is for the purpose of
carrying securities.44
The obvious objective of these provisions is to prevent eva-
28 Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). 39 Fed.
Res. Bull. 950 (1953), 12 C.F.R. § 220.111 (1969).
39 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(f) (8) (1969).
40 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(c) (1969).
41 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.2(i), 221.3(c) (1969).
42 12 C.Y.R. §§ 207.2(g), 221.3(d) (1969).
43 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.2(c) (1969).
44 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(b) (1969).
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sions of the margin requirements, and they would interdict most
arrangements which could be invented to avoid the regulations.
At the same time, the complex credit needs of a going business,
only one of which may be to purchase securities, frequently makes
the application of these provisions difficult. In responding to
inquiries about the distinction between purpose and non-purpose
credits, the Federal Reserve Board sometimes has focused on the
segregation of credits and of the collateral used to secure these
credits. At other times the Board has concentrated on whether a
particular transaction is a purchase or carrying under the regula-
tions. While most of the Board's rulings in this area are under
Regulation U, the same rationale probably would be applied to
inquiries under Regulation T.
B. Segregation of Credits
The Federal Reserve Board has interpreted the term "pur-
pose" very broadly, emphasizing that purpose cannot be deter-
mined upon a narrow analysis of the immediate use to which the
proceeds of a loan are put. For example, if a borrower purchases
exempt securities with the proceeds of a loan, but intends soon
thereafter to sell the securities and replace them with registered
stocks, the loan is a purpose loan.4 5 Similarly, a multi-purpose
loan, one purpose of which is to purchase registered securities,
is a purpose credit under Regulation U.46 Further, and more
troubling, where a loan is made solely on a borrower's signature
and becomes secured by registered stock shortly after the dis-
bursement, a bank's good faith in making a non-purpose loan is
subject to question. Good faith in making a non-purpose loan
requires a "reasonable diligence to learn the truth." The proper
exercise of such reasonable diligence demands that one possess
the same searching mentality as the Federal Reserve Board.47
The extent to which the Board will search out a purpose
to purchase securities is demonstrated by two of its rulings re-
garding loans to meet current expenses, secured by securities
fully paid for, where the borrower is making additional securities
purchases. One interpretation involved AT&T employees who
wished to take advantage of a stock option plan to buy company
shares through payroll deductions. Since the employees already
owned shares purchased under previous offerings, a bank proposed
4G 33 Fed. Res. Bull. 27 (1947), 12 C.F.R. § 221.101 (1969).
46 23 Fed. Res. Bull. 392-93 (1937). Cf. 31 Fed. Res. Bull. 1198 (1945) (loan
as addition to outstanding purpose loan).
47 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 256 (1959), 12 C.F.R. § 221.110 (1969); 39 Fed. Res.
Bull. 951 (1953), 12 C.F.R. § 221.106 (1969).
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to receive such shares as security for "living expenses" loans,
which would be advanced in monthly installments in the amount of
the employee's payroll deduction under the stock option plan. The
Board concluded that such a loan would violate Regulation U
if it exceeded the maximum loan value of the collateral, because
"[a]lthough the proposed loan would purport to be for living
expenses, it seems quite clear, in view of the relationship of the
loan to the Employees' Stock Plan, that its actual purpose would
be to enable the borrower to purchase AT&T stock, which is
registered on a national securities exchange.""8
The second interpretation involved a business concern which
proposed to purchase mutual fund shares, from time to time, with
proceeds from its accounts receivable, and then pledge the shares
with a bank in order to secure working capital. The Board held
that although the immediate purpose of the loan would be to re-
plenish working capital, as time went on the business would be ac-
quiring mutual fund shares at a cost that would exceed the net
earnings it normally would have accumulated, and therefore the
loans were subject to the purpose credit provisions of Regulation
U. Further, the Board stated that the deposit of proceeds from
accounts receivable in a time account for one year before using
those funds to purchase mutual fund shares would not change the
situation in any significant way.49
Of particular relevance to the investment banker is a Board
interpretation that a stock secured loan is a purpose credit under
Regulation U if it is made to enable the borrower to contribute
capital to a stock brokerage firm. This interpretation applies
whether the firm does only a commission business for customers
or a dealer business and whether the capital is new money or the
replacement of capital withdrawn from the firm."'
C. Purchase or Carrying of Securities
In grappling with the problem of what is a purchase or carry-
ing of securities under the credit regulations, the Federal Reserve
Board has attempted to distinguish between transactions which
increase the volume of credit in the securities markets and those
that do not. In taking this approach, the Board has adopted the
rationale of certain court decisions dealing with insiders' profits
under Section 16 (b) of the Exchange Act, which reject the charac-
terization of a transaction as a "purchase" where this accords with
48 48 Fed. Res. Bull. 690-91 (1962), 12 C.F.R. § 221.114(d) (1969).
41 53 Fed. Res. Bull. 964 (1967), 12 C.F.R. § 221.116 (1969).
O 32 Fed. Res. Bull. 995 (1946); See also 25 Fed. Res. Bull. 772 (1939).
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probable legislative intent, even though a literal reading of the
statute would yield the opposite conclusion.5
Thus the Board has held that a "transfer" of a corporation's
stock by a dealer to the corporation for the purpose of retiring
the shares, where only ten per cent of the consideration was paid
in cash, is not a "purchase" of the shares by the corporation under
Regulation T, and thus is permitted. The Board reasoned that
although from the dealer's viewpoint the transaction was a "sale"
and ordinarily a sale by one party connotes a purchase by the
other, the corporation did not become the owner of any securities
acquired through the use of credit. When the transaction was com-
pleted, the equity interest of the dealer was transmuted into a
dollar-obligation interest; in lieu of its status as a stockholder of
the corporation, the dealer became a creditor of the corporation.
The Board was convinced that an extension of credit to retire debt
securities was not for the purpose of purchasing securities,
whether the retirement was obligatory or voluntary, and it saw no
valid basis for distinguishing between the retirement of debt and
equity securities. 2 However, the Board has deemed the retirement
of debt securities to be for the purpose of carrying securities,
where the debentures were originally issued for the purpose of pur-
chasing or carrying stocks. 53
In a situation where the Board was required to consider both
purpose and segregation of credits, it made the distinction between
purchase and redemption even more tenuous. In response to a
question regarding a loan by a bank to an open-end investment
company that customarily purchases stocks registered on a na-
tional securities exchange, the Board held that in view of the gen-
eral operations of such a company, any loan by a bank to such a
company should be presumed to be subject to Regulation U as a
loan for the purpose of purchasing or carrying registered stocks.
Further, the fact that the company proposed to use the proceeds
of the loan to redeem some of its own shares did not make the loan
permissible, since application of the loan to some other use could
51 See Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom.
Blau v. Petteys, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 3S5 U.S. 1002 (1967).
G2 48 Fed. Res. Bull. 1589-90 (1962), 12 C.F.R. § 220.119 (1969).
5,3 23 Fed. Res. Bull. 717 (1937). In an apparently contradictory, yet con-
temporaneous interpretation, the Board held that the purchase of debentures by
a national bank, which were originally issued to purchase registered securities,
was not prohibited by Regulation U. 23 Fed. Res. Bull. 716 (1937). However,
this ruling is of little precedential value because Regulation U was then framed
in terms of "loans" instead of "extensions of credit," which in the Board's view,
was a broader concept.
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not foreclose the purchase or carrying of registered stocks as its
ultimate purpose.5 4
IV
EXCHANGE AND TENDER OFFERS
A. Extension of Credit
Almost anything other than a cash transaction probably in-
volves credit under the margin requirements. The terms "credit"
and "to extend" and "to maintain" credit are not defined in Reg-
ulations T, U or G. However, the terms "extension of credit" and
"to extend credit" have been defined by the Federal Reserve Board
in Regulation 0, which relates to extension of credit by member
banks to their executive officers. This definition includes any trans-
action as a result of which an executive officer becomes obligated
to a bank, directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever, by
reason of an endorsement on an obligation or otherwise, to pay
money or its equivalent, and it is so broad that there is a specific
exemption permitting executive officers to cash checks at banks."
The credit regulations were initially drafted in terms of loans
rather than credit extensions. In a 1937 interpretation the Federal
Reserve Board stated that "to extend credit" was a broader con-
cept than "to loan." 6 More recently, the Board considered
whether a corporation's guaranty of an "unsecured" bank loan
to exercise an option to purchase stock of the corporation was an
"extension of credit" for the purposes of Regulation G. Officers
and employees of the corporation obtained bank loans for the pur-
chase price of the stock from a bank by executing an unsecured
note. The corporation guaranteed the loans, holding the purchased
shares as collateral to secure it against loss on the guaranty. The
corporation's stock was registered on a national securities ex-
change. The Board concluded that a person who guarantees a loan
is lending his credit to the borrower, and that the guaranty de-
scribed should be considered an "extension of credit" under Reg-
ulation G, "in order to prevent circumvention of the regulation's
limitation on the amount of credit that can be extended on the se-
curity of registered stock.""7
54 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 1279 (1958), 12 C.F.R. § 221.109 (1969).
55 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(c) (1969).
56 23 Fed. Res. Bull. 717 (1937).
57 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 441 (1969), 12 C.F.R. § 207.104 (1969). The Board also
concluded that the bank involved violated the "arranging" provisions of Reg-
ulation U.
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B. Exempted Exchanges
Regulation T specifically exempts exchanges of any margin
or exempted security in a general account, special bond account
or special convertible security account, for the purpose of partic-
ipating in a reorganization or recapitalization in which the secu-
rity is involved. 18 This provision relates to the substitution
provisions of Regulation T, and is therefore an exemption as to
the permissible loan value of securities involved in a reorganiza-
tion and recapitalization, as opposed to an exemption as to a pur-
pose credit. 9 The terms "reorganization" and "recapitalization"
are not defined in Regulation T, and it can be assumed, therefore,
that the above described exemption covers reorganization under
the Internal Revenue Code as well as under the Bankruptcy Act. 0
Reorganizations and recapitalizations have been deemed pur-
chase and sale transactions under the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities acts,6 ' even though they sometimes have been
regarded as exempt transactions under the registration and other
provisions of the acts. 2 Whether the Federal Reserve Board
would regard a reorganization or recapitalization as a purchase of
securities subject to the credit regulations probably would depend
upon the particular facts involved.
It would appear that in an exchange of equity securities not
involving cash, the securities initially held would have the same
market value as the securities subsequently received. Therefore,
even assuming an exchange offer is a "purchase" of securities, no
extension of credit would be involved in such a transaction and
the credit regulations would not apply to it. The various types of
temporary advances of credit by a broker-dealer which could be
required in order to consummate exchange offers would also appear
to be exempted from the credit regulations. 63
Under a liberal construction of the credit regulations, an ex-
change of debt securities for equity securities, where the debt se-
5S 12 C.F.R. § 220.6(e) (1969). Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(g) (1969); 12 C.F.R.
§ 207.4(d) (1969).
59 Cf. 24 Fed. Res. Bull. 834 (1938).
CO Cf. I L. Loss, supra note 6, at 518-23.
61 SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Vine v. Beneficial Fin.
Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
02 1 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 518-42; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8177 (Oct. 10, 1967).
63 See 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(h) (1969) (loan value of unissued securities in a
general account); 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(3) (1969) (loan value of unissued se-
curities in a cash account); 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(d) (1969) (arbitrage account pro-
visions).
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curities are issued for the purpose of acquiring the equity securities
which are the subject of the exchange, could be construed as an
extension of credit for the purpose of purchasing securities. In this
situation, the lender is the equity stockholder, and the purchaser
is the corporation making the exchange offer. Therefore absent
special facts, a regulated loan is not involved. The question arises,
however, as to whether a broker-dealer which offers and sells such
debt securities is unlawfully "arranging" an extension of credit.
Where the equity securities involved in such an exchange are se-
curities of the same corporation which is issuing the debt secu-
rities, and the equity securities are then retired, the Federal
Reserve Board, in the ruling discussed above,64 regarded the ex-
change as exempt from the credit regulations. However, the Board
specifically left open the questions of whether an extention of
credit to purchase securities would be involved if the securities of
two different corporations were being exchanged or if equity secu-
rities acquired in exchange for debt securities were not imme-
diately retired.
In point of fact, exchange offers of debt for equity securities
are not uncommon. Many such offers have been registered with
the SEC, and the agency has never objected to any such exchange
offer on the ground that it violated Regulation T. In theory, there
is no reason to distinguish between a registered exchange offer and
the private placement, by an investment banker, of debentures in
exchange for equity securities. On the other hand, there is no rea-
son to distinguish, as far as practical effect is concerned, between
such an exchange and a debt offering to raise funds to purchase
equity securities.
Although the Federal Reserve Board has not published any
formal rulings covering the foregoing problems, the agency's staff
has informally been taking the position that a debenture offering
registered with the SEC pursuant to Section 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933 is not an extension of credit, whereas a private
placement of debt securities to purchase securities is an extension
of credit. The justification given for such a position is that a hold-
ing that registered debenture offerings are extensions of credit for
purposes of the margin requirements would fly in the face of cus-
tom and seriously damage the bond markets.
Nevertheless, where a long term debenture is issued in ex-
change for equity securities, the amount of credit available to the
ordinary investor to purchase or trade in the public securities mar-
kets is not increased whether the debenture offering is registered
64 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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or not. Additionally, such a transaction usually would have the
effect of taking securities off the market.
It is suggested that a distinction between sales of securities
and extensions of credit, based on the nature and quality of the
debentures, would be sounder, both theoretically and practically,
than the distinctions between registered and unregistered offerings.
An analogous distinction has been made under the reorganization
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, where short-term notes
(generally notes with a term of five years or less) are deemed in-
struments of deferred sale rather than securities.65 Similarly, short
term commercial paper(with a maturity of nine months or less)
is exempt from the definition of a security in the security acts.66
C. Cash Tender Offers
The Federal Reserve Board has stated that a stock secured
loan made for the business purpose of purchasing a controlling
interest in a corporation is subject to Regulation U. In reaching
this conclusion, the Board rejected the argument that such a loan
should be exempt on the ground that the Regulation is directed
solely toward purchases of stock for speculative or investment
purposes. 17 Since Regulation T is even more restrictive than Reg-
ulation U, there is no reason to suppose the Board would interpret
Regulation T any differently. Therefore, a broker-dealer could not
finance the purchase of a controlling equity interest of a corpo-
ration for a customer, and could not arrange for such financing,
except on the terms and conditions permitted by Regulation T.
This would appear to make participation by a broker-dealer
in the financing arrangements for a large number of cash tender
offers illegal. In the case of a tender offer for over-the-counter se-
curities which do not qualify as "O-T-C margin stock," this inter-
pretation of the credit regulations would be especially harsh and
illogical, because a broker-dealer may not extend or maintain any
credit on such securities, while a bank or other lender may do so.
Therefore, the manager of a tender for such securities could do
nothing to assist the tenderor to obtain lawful financing for the
tender offer, or participate in the negotiations for such financing. s
,us See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
00 Section 3(a) (3) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (a) (3);
§ 3(a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (10) (1964).
07 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 256 (1959), 12 C.F.R. § 221.110(b)(2) (1969).
(08 In Mletro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), an action was instituted for a preliminary injunction to enjoin
a tender offer because the financing of the offer by two European lending insti-
tutions allegedly violated Regulations T and G. Since the action was dismissed
on the ground that the foreign lenders were not subject to the credit regulations,
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V
INVESTMENTS IN NON-PUBLIC VENTURES
A. Closed Corporations and Investment Partnerships
The prohibitions contained in Regulation T against extend-
ing credit to a customer for the purpose of purchasing, carrying
or trading in securities, except where such loans are properly se-
cured by margin securities, apply to the securities of closed as
well as public corporations. Further, such prohibitions presumably
would apply to the financing of the organization of a closed cor-
poration, as well as to the purchase of control of the corporation.
A more troublesome question is whether such prohibitions
and/or the prohibitions of Regulations U and G apply to loans
obtained by the limited partners of a private investment partner-
ship in order to finance the purchase of their respective interests
in the partnership. For purposes of Section 5 of the Securities Act,
limited partnership interests probably would be deemed "securi-
ties,"6 9 and the definition of the term "security" in the Exchange
Act includes, among other things, a "participation in any profit-
sharing agreement.2 70 Nevertheless, to hold generally that a lim-
ited partnership interest in a private business venture is a security
under the credit regulations would appear to defeat one of the
purposes for which such regulations were enacted, namely to
channel credit away from the stock market to other parts of the
economy. Since a limited partnership interest would not be a
"margin stock" or "margin security" under Regulations U and G,
respectively, this is a problem which ordinarily would arise only
under Regulation T. However, there is one type of limited part-
nership interest which poses a problem under all three of the
credit regulations, namely an interest in an investment partner-
ship.
Where an investment partnership customarily purchases mar-
gin securities, a loan to purchase an interest in such a partnership
would appear to be a "purpose credit."71 In its informal guide-
lines pertaining to private investment partnerships, the New York
Stock Exchange has required that such a partnership conform to
Regulation T if its general or managing partners are connected
the court's opinion did not discuss the extent to which the financing of cash tender
offers by domestic lenders may be subject to the credit regulations.
09 I L. Loss, supra note 6, at 502-06.
70 15 U.S.C. § 78c (10) (1964).
71 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 1279 (1958); 32 Fed. Res. Bull. 995 (1946), 12 C.F.R.
§ 221.109 (1969).
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with a member firm 2 However, this requirement would appear to
relate to borrowings for the investment activities of the partner-
ship rather than any loans obtained by the partners in order to
make their initial capital contributions.
Where an investment partnership is formed to invest in the
securities of non-public companies-venture capital situations 73
-rather than in margin securities, the problem of the application
of the margin regulations to financing participations in such a
partnership becomes particularly acute. This type of investment
activity is almost diametrically opposed to the type of stock
market speculation which the margin requirements were designed
to limit. Nevertheless, under a liberal construction of the margin
regulations, a loan to finance a participation in a venture capital
fund could be deemed a "purpose credit" under Regulation T
and, if secured by stocks or by margin securities, under Regula-
tions U and G, respectively, as well.
B. Broker-Dealer Firms
In a special miscellaneous account, where the ordinary mar-
gin rules are not applicable, a broker-dealer may:
[e]xtend and maintain credit, (a) to or for any partner of a
firm which is a member of a national securities exchange to enable
such partner to make a contribution of capital to such firm, or to
purchase stock in an affiliated corporation of such firm, or (b) to
or for any person who is or will become the holder of stock of a
corporation which is a member of a national securities exchange
to enable such a person to purchase stock in such corporation, or to
purchase stock in an affiliated corporation of such corporation;
provided the lender as well as the borrower is a partner in such
member firm or a stockholder in such member corporation, or the
lender is a firm or a stockholder in such member corporation,
or the lender is a firm or corporation which is a member of a
national securities exchange and the borrower is a partner in such
firm or a stockholder in such corporation .... 74
It should be noted that a bank or Regulation G lender could
not finance such an investment, if secured by stocks or margin
securities, because such a loan would be deemed a "purpose
credit."7 Further, the above quoted exemption applies only to
72 PLI Corporate Law and Practice Transcript Series No. 2, Investment
Partnerships and "Offshore" Investment Funds 295 (1969) (Remarks of James F.
Swartz, Jr.).
73 See generally Venture Capital for Small Business-A Symposium, 24 Bus.
L. 935 (1969).
74 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(f)(2) (1969).
7G See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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the financing of investments in member firms of a national secu-
ities exchange, and would not apply to investments in over-the-
counter brokerage firms. Since the exemption covers capital
contributions to partnerships, as well as purchases of stock of
corporations, it would appear that capital contributions to private
investment funds other than broker-dealers, whether doing busi-
ness in corporate or partnership form, are at least presumptively
subject to the general provisions of Regulation T.
VI
BORROWING BY BROKER-DEALERS
AND ASSOCIATED PERSONS
A. Broker-Dealers
The usual prohibitions of Regulation T do not apply to
borrowings by an investment banking firm because a broker-
dealer ordinarily is not its own "customer" for purposes of the
regulation, even though principals of the broker-dealer may be
customers .7 Rather, borrowings by a broker-dealer are governed
by Regulation T which provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any creditor, directly or indirectly, to
borrow in the ordinary course of business as a broker or dealer
on any registered security (other than an exempted security)
except:(1) from or through a member bank of the Federal Reserve
System; or(2) from any nonmember bank which shall have filed with
the Board an agreement which is still in force and which is in
the form prescribed by this part; or
(3) to the extent to which, under the provisions of this part,
loans are permitted between members of a national securities ex-
change and/or brokers and/or dealers, or loans are permitted to
meet emergency needs. 77
The statutory authority for this section of Regulation T is
Section 8 of the Exchange Act'7 rather than section 7, which is
the basis for most of the provisions of Regulation T. Section 8
also covers the financial responsibility or net capital requirements
of broker-dealers and prohibitions concerning the hypothecation
of customers' securities. It would appear therefore that the pro-
visions restricting borrowing by broker-dealers are aimed primar-
ily at subjecting the rehypothecation of customers' securities to
the general margin limitations.
76 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(c) (1969).
77 12 C.F.R. § 220.5(a) (1969).
78 15 U.S.C. § 78h (1964).
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This conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history of the
Exchange Act. In the Senate Report accompanying the Act it was
explained that the ordinary procedure for the extension of a
margin loan was:
[f]or a broker to extend credit to his customer in order to finance
the purchase of a security, the broker in turn borrowing from a
banking institution or another broker. The ease and celerity with
which such a transaction is arranged, and the absence of any
scrutiny by the broker of the personal credit of the borrower, en-
courage the purchase of securities by persons with insufficient re-
sources to protect their accounts in the event of a decline in value
of the securities purchased.79
This was the evil which the margin regulations were designed to
eliminate without completely abolishing margin trading.
The restrictions against borrowing by broker-dealers in
Regulation T are complemented by certain provisions of Reg-
ulations U and G. Regulation G provides in pertinent part:
No lender shall extend or maintain any credit for the purpose
of purchasing or carrying any margin security to any customer who
is subject to Part 220 of this Chapter (Regulation T) without
collateral or on collateral consisting of margin securities (other
than exempted securities). Where the credit is to be used in the
ordinary course of business of such customer, such credit is pre-
sumed to be for the purpose of purchasing or carrying margin
securities unless the lender has in his records a statement to the
contrary .... 80
Regulation U exempts from its general provisions certain
types of credit extended to broker-dealers, specifically (1) credit
to aid in the financing of distributions of securities over-the-
counter; (2) credit to meet emergency needs; (3) credit secured
by properly hypothecated customers' securities; (4) credit to
finance deliveries against payment; (5) credit extended against
securities in transit; (6) same day credits; (7) credit to finance
arbitrage transactions; (8) credit to finance the transactions of
an odd-lot dealer; and (9) credit to exchange specialists and
O-T-C market makers.81
It should be noted that Section 220.5(a) of Regulation T,
set forth above, makes it unlawful for a creditor "to borrow"
rather than "to obtain credit," except under the conditions spec-
ified. Almost all other provisions of the credit regulations speak
in terms of credit extensions rather than loans, and there is some
authority for the proposition that "to extend credit" is a broader
7) S. Rep. No. 792, supra note 7, at 6-7.
80 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(f) (1969).
81 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.2, 221.3(o), 221.3(w) (1969).
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concept than "to loan." In two 1937 Federal Reserve Board in-
terpretations, the Board distinguished between a loan by a bank
to a corporation for the purpose of retiring debentures, and a
purchase by a bank of debentures issued to raise funds to pur-
chase stocks, ruling that the former loan was prohibited and the
latter purchase was permitted. 2 The Board felt that the term "to
loan" was not as broad as the term "to extend credit," and at the
time Regulation U was expressed in terms of "loans."
B. Associated Persons
In Sutro Brothers & Co., the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission held that the prohibitions of Section 7(c) of Regulation
T against arranging for credit in excess of that permitted under
the Regulation applies to arrangements for such credit made by
salesmen of a broker-dealer for their own accounts as well as for
the accounts of their customers. The Commission stated that:
A salesman who effects transactions in his own account oc-
cupies a dual role: in this capacity he clearly is a customer,
although in acting in other capacities he is a representative of the
broker-dealer .... A salesman effecting transactions in his own
account is a customer to whom the broker-dealer may advance
credit for the purchase of securities only as permitted for all
other customers, and it follows that the broker-dealer may arrange
for the extension of credit by another to the salesman-customer
only to the same extent as for other customers. It is immaterial that
the salesman himself is the instrument through whom the broker-
dealer arranges for the extension of credit; neither he nor the
broker-dealer can close his eyes to the fact that he is a represen-
tative of the broker-dealer whose acts may be attributed to the
broker-dealer.83
In Kidder Peabody & Co.,8 4 the Commission held that a regis-
tered representative violated Regulation T when he arranged
with a bank for an extension of credit to himself for the pur-
pose of purchasing and carrying unlisted and non-exempt securities
through his account where such loans were on terms and conditions
which the registrant could not lawfully maintain. The Commission
stated that "the provisions of Regulation T must be complied with
when a registered representative of a broker-dealer finances per-
sonal stock transactions by obtaining 'purpose loans' at a bank."
It should be noted that in the Sutro and Kidder Peabody cases the
lenders were not acting in violation of law.
The interpretation commonly given to these cases by the reg-
82 23 Fed. Res. Bull. 716, 717 (1937).
83 Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443, 451 (1963).
84 SEC Investment Advisor Act Release No. 232 (Oct. 16, 1968).
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ulatory agencies is that for the purposes of Regulation T a person
associated with a broker-dealer, whether as a principal or as an
employee, is both a customer and a creditor. Accordingly, the
borrowings of such an associated person for the purpose of pur-
chasing or carrying or trading in securities must be made on the
same terms and conditions as would prevail in loans by a broker-
dealer to a customer. This is the case even where the associated
person could obtain a bank loan or a loan from an unregulated
lender which would be in compliance with the law but which could
not be made by a broker-dealer.
C. Joint Ventures
Participation in a joint venture by a broker-dealer is not
exempt from the operation of Regulation T. On the contrary, any
joint venture in which a creditor participates is a customer for the
purposes of the regulation.8 5 Additionally, there is a specific provi-
sion stating that in an account which is otherwise covered by the
margin regulations which is a joint account in which the broker-
dealer participates, the adjusted debit balance of the account shall
include contributions by the creditor in excess of his right to par-
ticipate in the profits of the venture.8 6 This provision implies that
a disproportionate contribution to a joint venture is an extension
of credit under the margin requirements. Further, the formation of
a joint venture by a broker-dealer for the purpose of purchasing
securities in which the broker does not participate, but where cer-
tain joint venturers will be making contributions in excess of their
participation rights, therefore could be construed as violative of
those provisions which generally prohibit a broker from arranging
credit which he could not himself extend. In the event that a bro-
ker-dealer contributes less than his proportionate interest in the
profits of a venture, the applicability of the margin regulations is
less clear, because this would appear to fall within the provisions
relating to borrowing by broker-dealers, and probably should be
analyzed pursuant to such provisions.
The foregoing conclusions are bolstered by a recent Federal
Reserve Board interpretation of Regulation G which stated that a
contribution to a joint venture involved an extention of credit,
where a corporation contributed eighty per cent of the capital for a
joint venture to buy and sell securities with an individual who con-
tributed twenty per cent but was entitled to eighty per cent of the
profits or losses. Each participant received interest of eight per
85 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(c) (1969).
86 12 C.F.R. § 220.6(b) (1969).
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cent on his respective capital contribution, and the corporation had
the right to liquidate the joint portfolio if the individual's share of
the losses equaled or exceeded his twenty per cent contribution
to the venture. The Board felt that the incidents of the joint ven-
ture closely paralled those of an extension of margin credit, with
the corporation as the lender and the individual as the borrower. 7
VII
ARGUMENTS FOR EXEMPTING INVESTMENT BANKING
TRANSACTIONS FROM REGULATION T
A. The "No Customer" Theory
The margin requirements always have allowed a greater
latitude to banks than to brokers in various respects, notably the
loan value may be ascribed to securities other than margin secu-
rities. The historical reason for this distinction was Congress'
feeling that since over-the-counter securities had an indefinite
market value, brokers could evade the margin requirements by
extending credit on a package of registered and unregistered
securities and undervaluing the latter. However, it was felt that
banks would be less likely to so evade the law because they would
handle loans on unregistered securities as a purely commercial
proposition. Further, some draftsman thought brokers should be
out of the lending business altogether because of the temptation
to extend credit so as to increase their brokerage commissions."8
These considerations tie in with the objective of the margin reg-
ulations to protect the average public investor against buying
securities on too thin a margin.
However, the corporate client which goes to an investment
banker for advice and service in connection with a tender offer
or a private placement of debt securities for general corporate
purposes (which may include the purchase of securities), is not
an average investor or ordinary brokerage customer. The relation-
ship of such a corporation to its investment banker is far more
similar to the relationship of such a client to its commercial
banker, than the relationship of a public investor to a broker-
dealer."0 Although compensation may motivate the investment
banker to arrange the financing of a tender offer or the private
87 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 441-2 (1969), 12 C.F.R. § 207.104 (1969).
88 II L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1259 n.59. The premises upon which these
ideas were based were dubious, see Special Study, supra note 30, at 35-38, and
the distinctions between banks and brokers have recently been lessened, although
by no means eliminated. See note 4 supra.
89 See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 650-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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placement of securities these transactions are far removed from
lending money to a public investor in order to generate com-
mission business. The corporate client does not need the pro-
tection of Regulation T to guard against foolish speculation in
securities. In order to obtain financing for a tender offer, the
corporation will have to rely on the commercial soundness of
the tender as well as the company's general credit. Similarly,
in a private placement of debt securities, the purchasers fre-
quently are more knowledgeable and sophisticated, and the dis-
closures and representations more elaborate than in a public
offering pursuant to a registration statement filed with the SEC.
Particularly where a corporation can legally obtain such financing
from a bank or other lender, there is no valid reason why its
investment banker should not be able to assist in such credit
arrangements. It is precisely this type of expertise which is within
the peculiar province of an investment banker."
It therefore can be argued that a corporate client which
seeks out the services of an investment banker in connection
with a tender offer or the placement of debentures is not a "cus-
tomer" within the purview of Regulation T, even if this client
may be a customer with respect to ordinary brokerage trans-
actions in a margin or cash account, at least where the broker-
dealer is not extending credit to the client in connection with
the tender, or purchasing the debentures, but merely arranging
for financing from another source. In a tender offer, it is really
the tenderees rather than the tenderor who are "customers" in
the ordinary sense. Similarly, the purchasers of the debentures
rather than the issuer would ordinarily be brokerage customers.
A "customer" is defined in Regulation T as a person or
group "to or for whom a creditor is extending or maintaining
credit" or who, "in accordance with the ordinary usage of the
trade, would be considered a customer of the creditor."91 The
dictionary definition of a "customer" is "one who regularly, cus-
tomarily, or repeatedly makes purchases of, or has business
dealings with, a tradesman or business establishment; a buyer
or purchaser; a patron." By contrast, a "client" is defined as
"one who employs the services of any professional or business
man, as a customer.1 2 While the two words are synonymous if
used loosely, "customer" connotes a person who buys goods,
whereas "client" connotes a person who buys services. This
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
00 Comment, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103 (1967).
01 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(c) (1969).
92 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1968).
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difference is recognized in the ordinary usage of the trade in that
a broker usually will refer to a person who buys and sells securities
through him as a "customer" (and hence a registered represen-
tative who executes such orders commonly is referred to as a
"ccustomer's man"), whereas an investment banker usually will
refer to a person who has come to him for financial advice as a
"client."
The margin rules of the New York Stock Exchange do not
define customer except to state that the term includes "members,
member organizations, partners and stockholders therein, as well
as non-members. ' '9 3 However, other rules of the Exchange re-
lating to customers and customers' accounts connote the idea
that a customer is a person who effects transactions in securities
through a member." The overall provisions of Regulation T simi-
larly view the customer-creditor relationship in the context of
commission business.
In the case of investments by a broker-dealer for its own
account or investments by persons associated with broker-dealers,
the argument can also be made that such persons should not be
considered "customers" where such investments are in non-pub-
lic ventures. As explained above, a broker-dealer ordinarily is
not considered its own customer for the purposes of Regulation
T, but a person associated with a broker-dealer is regarded as
a customer. However, the provisions of Regulation T covering the
borrowings of a broker-dealer relate to borrowings "in the ordinary
course of business as a broker or dealer."" This phrase probably
covers transactions for the investment account of a broker-dealer.
In any event, neither the text of the regulation nor the legislative
history of the Exchange Act would justify the application of
Regulation T to transactions by a broker-dealer for its own
account involving securities other than margin securities.
Where an individual who is associated with a broker-dealer
engages in transactions in securities which are publicly traded,
there is some basis for the prevailing regulatory view that loans
to finance such transactions should be only on the terms and
conditions permitted by Regulation T. However, where such an
individual proposes to invest in a closed corporation or a limited
partnership, the justification for holding that Regulation T re-
quires that such an investment be made only on a cash basis
is tenuous. Indeed, since the definition of "customer" includes
93 Rule 432, New York Stock Exchange Constitution and Rules, II 2432,
3757-60 (1966).
I4 E.g., Rule 405, id. at ff 2405, 3700-01.
95 See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
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"fany partner in the firm who would be considered a customer of
the firm if he were not a partner," transactions by a partner
or employee which are not effected by or through a broker-dealer
ought to be deemed outside of the ambit of Regulation T.
It should be noted that neither the Federal Reserve Board
nor the SEC have shown any inclination to exclude any group of
persons from the definition of the term "customer" in Regulation
T. On the contrary, the SEC has held that transactions by a
broker-dealer cannot be exempted from Regulation T or similar
rules on the ground that they are "personal," '96 and it therefore has
been argued that any credit transaction in which a broker-dealer
engages is subject to Regulation T.9 7 One commentator has stated
that the definition of "customer" is so broad that it is practically
synonymous with "person," and therefore the investment banking
clients of brokerage firms are clearly "customers."', Similarly,
the Federal Reserve Board has stated that Regulation U applies
to the activities of a bank when it is acting in its capacity as
trustee. 90
B. The "No Purchase" Theory
The only interpretations of the Federal Reserve Board which
indicate any sort of an exemption from the credit regulations
in the investment banking area are its rulings that retirements
or redemptions of securities, which were originally issued for
a purpose other than to purchase or carry securities, are not
"purchases" under the regulations. In addition, the agency has
informally taken the view that debentures sold pursuant to a
registration statement under Section 5 of the Securities Act do
not constitute an extension of credit; the SEC similarly has
never announced or taken any action against registered exchange
offers of debt for equity securities.
Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve Board has specifically
left open its options in two crucial areas. In ruling that the ac-
quisition by a corporation of its own securities for the purpose
of retiring such securities was not a "purchase" under Regulation
T, the Board stated that this interpretation should not be regarded
as governing any other situations, for example, "cases where
securities are being transferred to someone other than the issuer,
96 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(c) (1969).
97 Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 802-03 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
767 (1943); F. R. Gentry & Co., 41 S.E.C. 314 (1963).
19 Weiss, Registration and Regulation of Brokers and Dealers 74 nn.12-13
(1965).
09 Comment, supra note 90, at 103, 113 n.60.
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or to the issuer for a purpose other than immediate retirement.
Whether the margin requirements are inapplicable to any such
situations would depend upon the relevant facts of actual cases
presented."' 00
Since the Board's theory in ruling that retirements are
exempt from Regulation T was that when the transaction was
completed "the equity interest of the dealer was transmitted
into a dollar-obligation interest" and the securities involved were
taken off the market, it is submitted that there should be no
difference in result where a corporation other than the issuer
purchases securities for the purpose of retirement. In certain
types of takeovers and acquisitions, this is precisely the ultimate
result of an exchange or tender offer. It is difficult, however, to
distinguish between tender offers of this type and purchases of
control, which, as pointed out above, the Federal Reserve Board
has stated are covered by the credit regulations.' As suggested
above, a more meaningful distinction between "purchases" and
exempt transfers probably could be based on the type of financing
involved.'02
In situations involving the formation of a new business
entity, it is probably as logical to argue that no purchase is in-
volved because new securities are being created, as it is to state
that a retirement or redemption does not involve a purchase
because security interests are extinguished. Further, in the case
of capital contributions to a newly formed closed corporation
or limited partnership, the use of such a theory could be justified
on the ground that no additional credit is being injected into the
public securities markets.
C. The "No Speculation" Theory
It can be persuasively argued that the reasons for the passage
of the credit regulations have no relevance to many of the in-
vestment banking transactions discussed herein. First, neither
the investment banking client nor the investment banker needs
to be protected from buying on too thin a margin. Second, the
formation of a new business entity does not, in and of itself, result
in a diversion of credit into the stock market from another sector
of the economy. Although a cash tender offer may temporarily
have such an effect, such a diversion is not for the purpose of
speculating in securities, but for long term legitimate business
100 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 1589 (1962), 12 C.F.R. § 220.119 (1969).
101 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
102 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
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purposes. In terms of the theoretical basis of the credit require-
ments, there is no reason to discriminate between the use of
investment capital for a takeover or acquisition and any new
business enterprise. Third, although takeovers and other corporate
acquisitions may have an effect on stock prices, the evil of a down-
side snowballing effect due to an excessive credit extension is not
a threat because once control of a corporation is acquired, it
cannot be disposed of quickly or easily, and frequently would
require registration under the Securities Act. Similarly, where
a loan is obtained to invest in a new business enterprise, the
the securities of which have no public market, the foreclosure
of such a loan would have no impact on the stock market."0 3
The test as to whether securities transactions are subject
to the margin regulations should be whether these transactions
result in new credit being injected into the stock market for
speculative purposes. In this connection, it is submitted that the
Federal Reserve Board interpretation"' that the purchase of
control of a corporation is a transaction covered by the credit
regulations is too broad. In situations involving a continuity of
credit, such as exchanges of securities having an equivalent market
value, the margin regulations do not apply. Where Corporation A
makes a tender offer for the equity securities of Corporation B
preliminary to a recapitalization or reorganization, so that Cor-
poration B's equity securities are either retired or exchanged
for shares of Corporation A, the credit regulations should permit
Corporation A to obtain what is really temporary financing to
acquire Corporation B's securities. Similarly, where Corporation A
makes a tender offer for the equity securities of Corporation B,
in order to acquire working control, the credit regulations should
not apply because such an acquisition has a long range investment
purpose, as opposed to a short term speculative purpose.
Transactions involving the securities of closed corporations
or limited partnerships have no impact on the public security
markets and the financing of such transactions should not be
restricted by the credit regulations. Where such private business
entities trade in the publicly traded securities of other companies,
then it is appropriate for the credit regulations to apply to such
transactions.10 1
103 See PLI Corporate Law Transcript Series No. 1, Texas Gulf Sulphur
Insider Disclosure Problems 451-57, 564-68 (1968); Comment, supra note 90, at
103, 120.
104 See note 67 supra.
105 See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
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VIII
CONCLUSION
This article has indicated a number of areas in which the
credit regulations, and particularly Regulation T, could prohibit
the financing of investment banking transactions. To the extent
that such transactions involve investments in securities which are
not publicly traded, the public interest as expressed in the Ex-
change Act is not served by the regulation of such transactions.
In addition, prevailing guidelines as to when and how the credit
regulations apply to various types of exchange and tender offers
are unclear and in certain respects are arbitrary.
This is not to argue that the investment banker should
be completely exempt from the restrictions of the credit reg-
ulations. Rather, the foregoing problems arise in large part because
the provisions of Regulations U and G applicable to banks and
other lenders probably are better suited to the business of the
investment banker than Regulation T which is primarily con-
cerned with the execution of brokerage transactions in listed
securities and publicly traded 0-T-C securities.
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